

THE NEW LATINO STUDIES READER

A Twenty-First-Century Perspective

EDITED BY

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WHAT'S IN A NAME?

The History and Politics of Hispanic and Latino Panethnicities

Ramón A. Gutiérrez

There is an apocryphal tale of recent popular vintage that circulates along the Mexico/United States border. It tells of an act of miscommunication, born of a mistranslation, between a Mexican immigrant traveling north and an officer of the U.S. Border Patrol trying to stem that flow. The Mexican woman named Molly was waiting in line to cross over to the American side. Finally, after hours of waiting, her interview moment with the U.S. Border Patrol agent arrived. The officer asked: "Are you Latina?" She replied: "No, no, no señor. Yo no soy la Tina. Yo soy la Molly. La Tina ya cruzó." ("No, no, no sir. I am not Tina. I am Molly. Tina already crossed.") The border agent was asking the woman about her ethnicity as a Latina. Molly, who was clearly unfamiliar with this U.S.-based ethnic category, interpreted the question as best she could. She heard "Latina" not as one word but as two—*la* and *Tina*—interpreting "*la*" as "the," and "*Tina*" as her friend's name. Indeed, her name was not Tina; it was Molly.

This story of miscommunication across national borders, when repeated, frequently provokes nervous laughter among Spanish/English bilingual speakers in the western United States. It shows how the ethnic groups and categories that are known and operate in one national space often make no sense when transported just a few miles north or south. When national regimes categorize populations, the very act of naming gives them a living reality.

Ethnic groups, whether deemed minorities in nation-states or simply identified as members of a subordinated and marginalized group in a given polity, have always resisted and defied the easy classifications of their oppressors. They generate the names

they use to refer to themselves as a collectivity, often in their own native language, thus underscoring their linguistic resistance to domination. Such group names are often rooted in religious and communal conceptions of personhood and kinship, as well as in history, language, and culture. Institutions such as the Catholic Church, professional guilds, even merchants hoping to monopolize markets for ethnic goods, have long had vested interests in naming, generating, and sustaining national understandings of group collectivity. My goals in this essay are several. At the theoretical level, I want to examine three moments in the history of what became the United States, looking at the contexts of power that produced particular understandings of social boundaries and group membership: the Spanish conquest of the indigenous peoples of Mexico's north, which started in 1598; the United States military's takeover of what became the American Southwest at the end of the Mexican War in 1848; and the mass decolonization civil rights movement undertaken by racialized minorities in the United States during the mid-1960s and early 1970s. At the lexical level, I want to show how a small set of ethnic labels, whether tied to self-understandings of group membership, to actual social behavior, or merely as text, emerged, evolved, and disappeared, only to reappear again with new meanings generations later. The emergence of ethnic labels that demarcate social boundaries occurs in different temporal registers, sometimes quite rapidly and other times more slowly.

Since the early 1970s, sociologists in the United States have been particularly fascinated by the emergence of panethnicities, which are confederations created when several distinct ethnic groups come together in alliance for social, economic, or cultural advantage, thereby augmenting their numeric power and influence around issues of common concern. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, for example, indigenous peoples such as the Cherokee, the Apache, and the Menominee came to be understood sociologically as "Native Americans." For several centuries conquering states had lumped them together as "Indians" in punitive ways that marked their subordination and marginalization. They had resisted such leveling, homogenization, and the eradication of their ancestral group differences, cleaving to their own internal ways of being and knowing, and defending their language and culture from the influence of those they labeled as outsiders and whites. But indigenous peoples in the United States had many common experiences. They had long histories of genocide and domination, of wars aimed at their eradication, of territorial segregation on reservations, and of similar structural relationships to the federal government. Calling themselves "Native Americans" made sense not only as a way of consolidating their factionalized power but also of maximizing their use of civil rights, voting rights, and affirmative action policies.

Immigrants and long-time residents hailing from such divergent places as Mexico, Puerto Rico, and the Dominican Republic began celebrating their unity as "Latinos" in the 1970s, just as persons from such distinct places as China, Japan, and Korea came

to call themselves "Asian Americans" in the United States. As new panethnic groups, they protested their marginalization and the toxic legacies of racism, militated for political recognition, and petitioned the state for compensatory remedies, demonstrating not only broader levels of interaction among their different national groups but also a heightened sense of oppositional consciousness in relationship to the state.

The rise of such new nationalisms is not an entirely unique or new sociological process. Historian Eric J. Hobsbawm reminds us in *Nations and Nationalism since 1870*, how emerging nation-states, through a process he calls "nationalism from above," transformed the residents of the ancient kingdoms of Castile, Aragón, Asturias, and León into Spaniards through mandatory language instruction, compulsory public schooling, and military service, just as the United States forged Polish, Italian, and German immigrants into Americans using these same institutions and techniques for similar ends.¹ What is new and distinct about panethnicities is that they can emerge not only from above through the actions of states and elites, but they also percolate upward from below, as acts of popular mobilization and consciousness in direct opposition to state actions.²

Many of the people of European ancestry who first colonized and settled what eventually became the American Southwest migrated there from the Iberian Peninsula, from what we now call Spain, but which in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was a series of independent kingdoms that were gradually aggregated, most definitively by the 1469 marriage of King Ferdinand of Aragón and Queen Isabella of Castile, which laid the foundation for the emergence of modern Spain. Several decades before the English founded Jamestown in 1607 or the Pilgrims landed at Plymouth colony in 1620, residents of Spain's medieval kingdoms had already established a permanent settlement in Saint Augustine in Florida (1565) and begun colonizing the kingdom of New Mexico, which by 1598 encompassed roughly the current states of New Mexico and Arizona. Texas's first Spanish settlements date from 1691, and those of Alta California began with the founding of San Diego in 1769. The kingdom of New Mexico and the provinces of Texas and Alta California were all situated at the northern edge of Spain's American empire, isolated from one another, surrounded on all sides by mostly hostile indigenous groups, and too distant from the major centers of Spanish culture in central Mexico and Cuba for frequent or rapid communication. What developed in each of these provinces over the centuries were distinct regional subcultures that were Spanish in name and form, but thoroughly hybrid in culture due to prolonged contact with local indigenous groups.

National consciousness, by which I mean a sense of membership as a resident or citizen of a particular nation-state, did not exist as a well-developed sentiment among the colonists who initially left the Iberian Peninsula, migrated to Cuba and Puerto Rico, and then moved on to Mexico, eventually settling New Spain's north. What affinity they most shared and expressed was religious; they were Christians first and foremost. The fervor

of their religious sentiment was forged during the Crusades and particularly strengthened over nearly eight centuries of warfare during the Iberian Reconquest between AD 711 and 1492, when the Christian monarchs rallied their populations behind the standard of the cross, vanquishing the Moors and pushing the influence of Islam south. What victories the Christian kings won in those years were won in the name of their one true God. The year 1492 marked the acme of the Reconquest with the fall of the last Moorish stronghold in Granada, the underwriting of Christopher Columbus's voyage of discovery westward, and the intensification of religious orthodoxy, leading to Jewish and Muslim forced conversions to Christianity, and eventually to their expulsion. From 1492 onward, Spain's public culture was Christian to the core. The first and most distinct sense of group membership among the residents of Spain's enormous empire was as *cristianos viejos*, or "old Christians." Men and women who were firm in their faith stood ready to defend it from neophytes, from infidels and heretics, and from *cristianos nuevos*, or "New Christians," which in Spain was made up of recently and forcibly converted Moors and Jews, and in the Americas of equally recent indigenous converts to the faith.³

The *patria chica*, the "small fatherland," or the region of origin, was next in importance to these colonists. By the sixteenth century, each of Spain's kingdoms had a well-developed *conciencia de sí*, or "self-consciousness." After men and women proclaimed themselves Christians, they boasted of their rootedness in local affairs as Aragonese, Catalans, Galicians, and Castilians. Indeed the word the indigenous peoples of the southwestern United States first used to describe their new Spanish overlords was *Castillas*, meaning a person from the kingdom of Castile. Though initially the native peoples understood very little of what soldiers told them in Spanish, they did repeatedly hear them call themselves *castellanos*, announcing that the natives were now subjects of *Castilla* and that a king in *Castilla* was their new lord. Gaspar Pérez de Villagrà, who participated in the 1598 conquest of New Mexico and in 1610 commemorated the feats in his book *Historia de la Nueva México*, reported that the residents of Acoma Pueblo "called to me, crying, Castilian! Castilian! . . . Zutacapan [their chief] asked me if more Castilians followed me and how long before they would arrive."⁴

Identification with Spain's various regions persisted in the Americas into the nineteenth century, whether in Cuba, Hispaniola, Puerto Rico, or Mexico. Residents of the kingdom of New Mexico called themselves *nuevo mexicanos* and *neomexicanos*, those in California referred to themselves as *californios*, and those in Texas as *tejanos*. Throughout Spanish America loyalty and a sense of attachment to the *patria chica*, to one's natal place, persisted and remains strong even to this day.

The Spanish conquest and colonization of the Americas brought together men from different regions, and through their common experiences of warfare, established them as a victorious colonizing class. The men who marched into the Aztec capital at Tenochtitlán in 1519 most likely had never before thought of themselves as Spaniards, or *españoles*. This was so because a unitary nation-state had only begun to emerge recently, as a result of the unification of the kingdoms of Aragón and Castile, born of the 1469

marriage of King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella, and because these men were more deeply invested in their Christianity and regional loyalties to place. It was in the Americas that they came to think of themselves as "Spaniards," particularly when confronting indigenous peoples as overlords. This is how the emerging Spanish nation-state, from above, forged a panethnic sense of group membership. By calling themselves *españoles* the colonists acknowledged that their culture and social institutions were of Iberian origin and thus quite different from those of the indigenous peoples they called *indios*, or "Indians." Three hundred years of contact between these two groups through intermarriage and cohabitation would radically transform what it meant to be *español* and *indio*, but about that there will be much more to say below.⁵

Just as *españoles* were forged in the foundry of warfare through their battlefield victories as Christian soldiers in Mexico, Central America, and Peru, so too the vanquishment of their enemies transformed America's native peoples into *indios*, or "Indians." In 1491, on the eve of the Columbian voyages, there were some 123 distinct indigenous language families spoken in the Americas, with more than 260 different languages in Mexico alone. Perhaps as many as 20 million people were living in the Valley of Mexico in 1519, in hierarchical, complexly stratified theocratic states.⁶ But there were no Indians. Christopher Columbus invented them in 1492 by mistakenly believing that he had reached India, and thus calling them *indios* producing the lexical distinction we now use to refer to the Caribbean as the West Indies and to India as the East Indies. Inventing Indians was to serve an important imperial end for Spain, for by calling the natives *indios*, the Spaniards erased and leveled the diverse and complex indigenous political and religious hierarchies they found. Where once there had been many ethnic groups stratified as native lords, warriors, craftsmen, hunters, farmers, and slaves, the power of imperial Spain was not only to vanquish but also to define, largely reducing peoples such as the mighty Aztecs into a defeated Indian class that soon bore the pain of subjugation as tribute-paying racialized subjects.

Militant Christian *españoles* colonized Hispaniola, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Mexico, and New Mexico in the name of Spain's Christian monarchs. As conquering soldiers they carried writs of incorporation (*capitulaciones*) for the formation of towns, which included aristocratic titles, land grants, and tributary *indios* they could exploit mercilessly, but whom they were also expected to Christianize and protect. The Catholic priests who accompanied these colonists carried all the symbols in which their ethnicity was rooted: the sacred texts and stories of the Bible; the altars, crosses, and statuary that connected the terrestrial community to the celestial one; and all the religious ritual formulas that conjoined the sacred and profane, and which ordered time and space.

Yearly in Santa Fe, New Mexico, the city's founding is still routinely remembered by reenacting the submission of the Pueblo Indian chiefs before Don Juan de Oñate, the area's conquistador, as it was done and described in 1598.⁷ This is the occasion for the staging of didactic dramas such as "The Christians and the Moors," which in the late 1600s was marked by "loud acclamations from the soldiers, with a salvo of harquebuses,

and by skirmishes and horse races." Wooden lanterns known as *luminarias*, which are still lit on important dates of the Christian calendar, were meant to evoke memories of the heat of battle, the fire and destruction the *españoles* used to establish their supremacy over the *indios* and the imposition of their Christian God and culture. Even the bedecked and bejeweled statue of *La Conquistador*, Our Lady of the Conquest, is taken annually from her venerated perch in church and processed through the streets, unifying and sanctifying the space she traverses. The messages encoded in all of these ritual acts are not lost on observers of Santa Fe's fiesta, for as a Taos Pueblo Indian woman recently pronounced, the skirmishes, the bonfires, the dramas all symbolized "the brute force the Spanish used" to conquer the land.⁸

The Pueblo Indians, of course, have long resisted such chauvinistic celebrations. In 1998, someone from the northern Pueblos severed the right foot of the large bronze equestrian statue of Don Juan de Oñate, the Spanish conqueror of the kingdom of New Mexico, which sits in front of the Oñate Monument and Visitors Center near Española, New Mexico. The vandal's explicit political goal was to force everyone to recall the collective punishment Oñate meted out to the residents of Acoma Pueblo in 1600 for resisting his tributary demands: every man over the age of twenty-five had one of his feet cut off, the women and children over the age of twelve were condemned to twenty years of slavery, and the children were distributed to serve as servants in Spanish households. As Andrés Lauriano, of Sandía Pueblo noted of the foot severed from the Oñate statue, "When I think of what Oñate did . . . I have a vision of Indian men lined up to have one foot cut off. I see the blood pouring from their legs as they crawled or hopped away. I see the bloody pile of feet left behind."⁹

The *españoles* who settled Mexico's north were extremely status conscious and viewed society as hierarchically ranked by religion, property ownership, occupation, race, and legitimacy of birth. Whenever anyone came before a state official, whether civil or ecclesiastical, between roughly 1600 and 1760, the first fact recorded in the legal documents was a person's *calidad*, literally his or her "quality" or "social status." Social privileges and corporal punishment were based on such standing. Thus petitions, denunciations, even routine investigations of any sort always began with a formulaic statement that established one's status and group membership. For example: Pedro López "*es de calidad mestizo, obrero, hijo legítimo de María Sánchez y Fabián López, y cristiano nuevo*" (Pedro López's quality is *mestizo*, a laborer, the legitimate son of María Sánchez and Fabián López, and a New Christian).

Starting in the 1760s, and stretching all the way into the 1820s, explicit discussions of race took on a greater importance in the establishment of one's *calidad*. Though legal color categories had been widely known and codified as the *régimen de castas* since the founding of Spain's colonies in the Americas, these were not broadly invoked by church or state functionaries at the local level until the middle of the eighteenth century, when more-extensive racial mixing began taking place. Access to marital partners and honorific posts, to desirable occupations, and even to the Roman Catholic priesthood was

based on one's ability to prove one's genealogical racial purity according to the categories of the code.¹⁰

The *régimen de castas* defined precisely every possible biological mixture that could occur when Spaniards, Indians, and Africans mated and reproduced. A Spaniard and an Indian produced a *mestizo*. A *mestizo* and a Spanish woman begot a *castizo*. The mating of a Spanish man and a mulatto woman produced a *morisco*, and so on. The code spelled out for six generations of descent the exact level of biological mixing from an original set of ancestors, yielding racial categories that were quite difficult for individuals to perceive or to recognize in phenotype, much less for church and state officials to reconcile the personal declarations they were given with their own physical observations of the person who stood before them. Theoretically, this classificatory system visually fused notions of blood, ancestry, and lineage so that without reference to baptismal certificates, family histories, or personal genealogies one could quickly glance at a person's physique and just as rapidly conclude if a person was of pure blood, of gentle birth, and of an honorable past. In Spain even remotely impure blood derived from mixing with Jews, Moors, and heretics disqualified a person from high honorific posts. In the Americas contact with Indians and African slaves was deemed equally polluting. Physical color or appearance, what today we call "phenotype," became the basis by which state and church officials praised and reviled their subjects and privileged or punished the racial groups society deemed most inferior.

The *españoles* in Mexico's north in the 1760s began to imagine colonial society and themselves in much more complicated ways than the original conquest dichotomy between Spaniards and Indians allowed, precisely because the *régimen de castas* provided them with a more capacious lexicon for understanding racial difference. The reality on the ground after several generations of miscegenation was that only at the polar extremes of the racial classification system did the categories actually fit any visible physical types. The *régimen de castas* was intended to protect the privileges of local nobilities. But as the quickening of the economy undertaken by the Bourbon Reforms in the second half of the eighteenth century took hold, status increasingly became based on enterprise and personal achievement, thus displacing notions of aristocracy and social standing rooted in memory of the by then remote facts of conquest. When the crown began selling writs of whiteness, known as *gracias al sacar*, to anyone who could afford them in the 1760s, the system of racial classification was doomed, and indeed was abolished with Mexico's independence in 1821.¹¹

Racial status was of grand importance because it was intimately associated with one's legitimacy or illegitimacy at birth. The legal scholar Juan de Solórzano y Pereira in his *Política Indiana* (1648) maintained that illegitimates were "Those born of adulterous or other illicit and punishable unions, because there are few Spaniards of honor who marry Indian or negro women; this defect of birth makes them infamous, at least *infama facti*, according to the weighty and common opinion of serious scholars; they carry the stain of different colors and other vices."¹² Throughout the colonial period, illegitimacy was

deemed an indecent and shameful mark because of its association with mixed racial unions and the generation of race.

The multiple categories that defined a person's *calidad* were intricately tied to one another. A person's reputation was a summation of these various measures of social standing, made particularly clear in social action. The fiercest fighting words one could utter were slurs that impugned a person's total social personality—his or her race, ancestry, and position in the division of labor. The fight that occurred in Albuquerque, New Mexico, on June 3, 1765, between Eusebio Chávez and his father-in-law, Andrés Martín, illustrates this point. Chávez beat Martín with a large stick and dragged him by his hair, leaving Martín's arm badly bruised, his chest covered with black and blue welts, his scalp swollen out of shape, and his hair completely tangled and caked in blood. The reason: Martín had called Chávez a "*perro mulato hijo de puta*" (a mixed-blood dog son of a bitch). One insult, perhaps, would have been enough, but by calling Chávez a dog, Martín implied that he was less than human, a habit well understood by Spaniards who often referred to the Indians as dogs. He added that Chávez was of mixed blood, and if truly a son of a bitch, he was undoubtedly illegitimate. Martín had thus combined three statuses to insult Chávez.¹³

Functionaries of the Catholic Church and the Spanish state often used the same racial and ethnic categories because these were the ones that had been generated initially through the process of Christian expansion into new territories. One exception widely used in Mexico's north during the colonial period, particularly in California, was the racialized category *gente de razón*, literally "people of reason," or rational beings. Its meaning in social life is best understood through its opposite, or *gente sin razón*, "people lacking reason," as irrational persons. The Holy Office of the Inquisition concocted this legal distinction to protect the Indian from prosecution for heretical ideas. The inquisitors reasoned that the Indians were *gente sin razón*, mere children lacking the rational faculties to understand the dogmas of faith and the errors of their ways. Everyone deemed a rational person was punishable for exercising his or her knowledge and will in the commitment of evil acts. With the demise of the Inquisition in the early 1800s, the term *gente de razón* remained in circulation in Mexico's north as a way of differentiating individuals who were culturally "Spanish" from those who lived by their more traditional "Indian" ways; more infrequently it was used to differentiate fluent Spanish speakers from those who were not.

Indian slavery was a significant social institution throughout Mexico's north and accordingly generated the stigmatized *genízaro* ethnic category, which first appeared in New Mexican documents at the beginning of the eighteenth century and from there spread outward to Texas and California, where it was also recorded in the documentation of social life. The *genízaros* were Apache, Navajo, Ute, and Comanche Indians, enslaved during raids the Spaniards provoked to profit from the lucrative trade in captives. In time, Pueblo Indian foundlings abandoned by their indigenous mothers as the products of rape, as well as adults exiled from Indian towns because of some transgres-

sion, came to be referred to as *genízaros*. Approximately 4,000 person of indigenous ancestry called *genízaros* entered New Mexican society during the eighteenth century. By the 1750s they composed about one-third of New Mexican society. They were considered marginal because of their slave, ex-slave, or outcast status.¹⁴ *Genízaros* did not own land, spoke a distinctive broken form of Spanish, were residentially segregated, married endogamously, and shared a corporate sense, living together, said Fray Carlos Delgado in 1744, in great unity "*como si fueran una nación*" (as if they were a nation).¹⁵ Fray Afanasio Domínguez described the *genízaros* he met in New Mexico in 1776 as "weak, gamblers, liars, cheats, and petty thieves." This caricature survived for centuries. Mischievous and unruly children today are still ridiculed in the American Southwest with the saying "*genízaro, genízaro, puro indio de rescate*" (*genízaro, genízaro, pure bartered Indian*). When New Mexicans now say "*no seas genízaro*," or "don't be a *genízaro*," they mean "don't be a liar." Anthropologist Florence Hawley Ellis was told by the villagers of Torné in the 1950s that the *genízaro* residents in the adjacent village of Belén were "semi-slave, low class, and without ability." Anthropologist Frances Swadesh encountered the same stereotypes in the 1970s in northern New Mexico. When someone was referred to as *genízaro* there, it meant crude, low class, and "indiado" (Indian-like).¹⁶

Some ethnic classifications still used in the American Southwest originated in the legal categories of the *régimen de castas* but took on significant new meanings. In the colonial period, Spaniards did not hesitate to dehumanize Indians and those they deemed half-breeds by barking the epithet "dog" at them, usually in combination with some other expletive: dirty dog, Indian dog, half-breed dog. Half-breeds were thus frequently called *lobos* and *coyotes*, denoting an unspecific mixture between a Spaniard and an Indian. With both of these categories, the mixed-blood individual was portrayed as a low species close to an animal. *Lobo* and *coyote* are still used in common parlance to refer to persons of any racial mix between Anglo and Mexican.

Colonized subjects always develop rich vocabularies to describe their colonizers. This was the case among the native peoples the Spaniards conquered. How ethnicity was described, both then and now, depended on the language used, whether it was in the tongue of the colonizers or the colonized, thus giving different valances to the utterances of outsiders versus those of insiders, or members of one's own group. The Pueblo, the Yaqui, and the Mayo Indians all had insider terms in their native languages for the *españoles* and *castillas* based on the most dominant aspect of their religion. Among the Pueblo Indians, the Spaniards were called "wet-heads" because of the water poured on a person's head at baptism. The Yaqui and Mayo Indians called the Spaniards "water-fathers" for similar reasons.¹⁷

We move now from Mexico's colonial far north to what was to become the American Southwest, where we will explore a similar territorial conquest and the ethnic categories that were used to define and describe the conquerors and the conquered in the new

regime. To understand how the United States came to exercise sovereignty over what had previously been Mexico's far north, let us recall the anticolonial revolutions that engulfed England (American independence in 1776), France (Haitian independence in 1804), and Spain (Spanish American independence 1807–1821). In 1700 the last Spanish Hapsburg king died without an heir, leading to the War of the Spanish Succession and ushering in the French Bourbon monarchs, who became known for the economic, political, and cultural reforms they undertook in Spain's vast empire. The reforms, collectively known as the Bourbon Reforms, had several goals: to streamline the administrative structure of Spain's overseas empire, to boost the colonial economies through free trade and heightened communication, to increase silver extraction and taxation, and to neutralize the extensive indigenous warfare that had plagued Mexico's north. If Spain's first colonization was directed at exploiting the native peoples of the Americas, the Bourbon Reforms were viewed as a second colonization, aimed this time at undermining the power of wealthy regional elites and focused mostly on the interests of local *españoles* and *mestizos* who had been born, reared, and assimilated in the New World.

Under the Bourbon Reforms, local *criollo* or creole bureaucrats in America were increasingly replaced by *peninsulares*, men born in Spain who were assumed loyal to the king and thus more deeply moored to metropolitan interests and affairs. Free trade policies were intended to destroy local industries (and did), which had taken centuries to develop, forcing Americans to again become more dependent on the goods Spain produced and exported. Taxes and silver bullion were needed to finance European wars and conspicuous consumption at home. What remained in America were heavily taxed colonial subjects with long lists of grievances and deep resentments toward the monarchy and its metropolitan agents.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the only persons in Mexico's far north who could genuinely claim that they were *peninsulares* were colonial bureaucrats and priests, and it was between them and the local *criollo* elites that intense struggles emerged in New Mexico, Texas, and California. Further south, in the urban centers of Mexico and Peru, by the early 1800s the creole elite began looking beyond Spain for their redemption, finding models for the overthrow of monarchy and the creation of popular self-governance in the United States and France. Between 1807 and 1821, all of Spanish America, save for a few regions, gained independence, inspired by liberal political theorists. Spanish Americans mostly chose republican forms of government, the exception being Mexico, where independence began with the short-lived constitutional monarchy of King and Emperor Agustín de Iturbide, who reigned from 1821 to 1823. Cuba, Puerto Rico, Hispaniola, and the Philippines all began independence movements at roughly the same time, but only the Dominican Republic succeeded, in 1844.

When Mexican independence arrived in 1821, a host of categories based on property, race, gender, age, and legitimacy were still being used to describe the social stratification that had been imposed by the Spanish conquerors over the indigenous peoples. Thus, when news of Mexico's independence reached New Mexico, Texas, and Califor-

nia, the residents did not immediately call themselves *mexicanos* or Mexicans, probably because the authority of the newly established Mexican nation-state remained fragile until 1857, torn as it was politically by conflicts among centralists and federalists, liberals and conservatives. The term *mexicano* began to appear in legal documents and census records only in the 1830s, and then, for only a small percentage of the population. In New Mexico only about 5 percent of all individuals who married legally between 1830 and 1839 claimed that they were *mexicanos*. The rest continued calling themselves *españoles*. As the newly established Mexican nation-state bestowed large land grants on individuals willing to settle the north, particularly in those poorly protected frontier areas coveted by England, the United States, France, and Russia, and under constant attack by the Apache and Comanche Indians, the category *vecino* took on increasing import, differentiating these propertied citizen males from landless peasants.¹⁸

Mexico was faced with numerous challenges between 1821 and 1880, which the wars of independence left it ill prepared for. The new state emerged weak and remained fragile because of the constant wars and invasions Mexico experienced in this period. It waged a century-long war against the Comanches and Apaches in the north. Texas rebelled and gained its independence in 1836. The French invaded and occupied Mexico in 1838–1839, and again in 1861–1867. The United States invaded Mexico in 1846, and at war's end in 1848, seized its northern provinces. Throughout all of this, Mexico was at war with itself, ripped apart by conflicts between liberals and conservatives over what form of government and whose interests would be advanced and protected. Mexico's precarious state of affairs in this period is best reflected by the fact that between 1821 and 1857, on average, there was a new head of state every year.

While Mexico struggled, Spain, France, England, and the United States were themselves locked in intense rivalries precisely over their national boundaries. In 1803 Thomas Jefferson negotiated the purchase of the Louisiana Territory from Napoleon, a transfer Spain refused to recognize until 1819. That year, too, John Quincy Adams, President James Monroe's secretary of state, signed the Transcontinental Treaty with Spain, purchasing Florida for \$5 million. Spain thus acknowledged U.S. ownership of Louisiana; the United States conceded Spain's sovereignty over all of Texas west of the Sabine River. In the midst of these diplomatic negotiations, the United States was monetarily aiding the independence movements of Spain's colonies. In 1823 President Monroe pronounced what became known as the Monroe Doctrine, warning European powers that any foreign intervention in the hemisphere would be deemed a bellicose act that would provoke intervention by the United States.

It was in this contentious context over Mexico's eventual shape and form that Mexican *tejanos*, and the Anglo immigrants who settled in Texas, declared their independence in 1836 as the Republic of Texas. A decade later, in 1846, the United States fabricated a border dispute to provoke war with Mexico. What for decades the United States had attempted to purchase with cash, it then took by force in the name of its "Manifest Destiny." The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which ended the war in 1848, ceded close

to two-thirds of Mexico's national territory. The United States thus emerged as a nation that reached from coast to coast, with ports on the Pacific Ocean from which it could exploit the lucrative trade with Asia.

U.S. sovereignty over the ceded Mexican territories and over Texas, which was simultaneously annexed and became a state in 1845, created a new political order for the longtime residents of what became the American Southwest. Much as *españoles* had established their military dominance over the indigenous peoples of Mexico after 1521, and marked that subjugation through a number of demeaning legal categories, so too citizens of the United States arrived in the Southwest vaunting their superiority, establishing structures of domination, and asserting that their primacy was rooted in their Protestant God, in their laws and constabularies, in the purity of their whiteness, and in their very way of life. Whereas in 1521 the colonists who arrived in the Americas from the Iberian Peninsula transformed their notions of group belonging to become *españoles* with lordship over *indios*, so the soldiers and settlers who ventured westward after 1848 defined themselves as "Anglos" and "Anglo-Americans," calling the longtime residents "Mexicans," which as we saw above, was not particularly germane, given the recentness of Mexico's national independence. The process of linguistic erasure Christopher Columbus undertook by naming "Indians" where none had existed before likewise was used by the Americans to flatten Mexican class and ethnic distinctions, calling all locals "Mexicans" despite the fact that this denomination had never really developed roots.

The resident ethnic Mexican population used a number of Spanish-language words to describe their new Americans lords. When speaking Spanish the *mexicanos* called the outsiders *extranjeros*, or "foreigners," labeling themselves *nativos*, or "natives."¹⁹ As the number of migrants increased, the ethnic lexicon became more complex. They were called *anglos*, *anglosajones*, and *americanos*; with *americanos* or Americans becoming and remaining the most popular over time.²⁰ But there were also a slew of other ethnic categories that were employed in the Spanish language that more acutely described the cultural politics of domination. *Mexicano* polychromatic sensitivities to race and color focused on the peculiarities of *americano* skin, eye, and hair color, and to the size of their feet. Accordingly, in newspapers and songs, in insults and expletives are found *canosos* (gray-haired), *colorao* (red-faced), *bolillo* (doughy faced), *cara de pan crudo* (bread dough face), *ojos de gato* (cat eyes), and *patón* (big foot). Other Mexican ethnic labels for the Americans were the result of misunderstandings of the English language. The word *gringo*, for example, comes from a linguistic corruption of a song the Mexican soldiers heard the Texas rebels singing at the Alamo in 1836. The first two words of the prairie song "Green Grows the Grass of Kentucky" were heard by Mexicans as "*grin gros*" and, finally, as one word, *gringos*, which remains the most common way Americans are referred to when *mexicanos* want to express contempt and derision toward them as a dominant class. Because the *americanos* allegedly loved eating cabbage, or at least those of Irish origin were said to, they were often called *repolleros*, or "cabbage eaters."

And because of their penchant for chewing tobacco, rather than the Mexican custom of smoking it, they became known as *masca tabacos*.²¹

Some of the negative ethnic categories used to describe the Americans originated farther south as insults first used by Mexicans to describe their French invaders. So was the case for the derogatory term *gabacho*. Its etymology is the Provençal word *gabach*, which means "foreigner" but also "froggy" and "Frenchy." As is apparent from this etymology, *gabacho* was used in Spain and Mexico to express contempt for the French. The word *güero* (blond) was similarly born in diplomatic relations with Mexicans describing the skin color of their French occupiers as devoid of color, as "empty," or *huero*.²²

Anglo-Americans were equally adept at name-calling. The Mexican diet was the source of much inspiration. Most histories of the use of the word "greaser" to refer to Mexicans offer a utilitarian explanation noting the *mexicano's* penchant for cooking with lard, which can be heated to high temperatures to rapidly cook food. The word was also used to describe Mexican oily skin, the logical result of cooking with and eating lard. These primal etymologies became more complex when referring to the labor Mexicans performed, particularly the dirty work of greasing the wheels of the carts on which they carried people and goods to markets. By the 1850s "greaser" had taken on overtly racist and segregationist meanings. One American passing through El Paso offered the following definition: "A 'greaser' was a Mexican—originating in the filthy, greasy appearance of the natives."²³ Contempt for Mexicans produced California's infamous 1855 "Greaser Act," which authorized authorities to arrest "all persons who are commonly known as 'Greasers' or the issue of Spanish and Indian blood . . . who go armed and are not known to be peaceable and quiet persons, and who can give no good account of themselves."²⁴ Subsequently, Mexicans are described as living in a segregated California town called "Greaser Gulch." From "greaser" other insults eventually emerged, such as "grease-ball" and "goo-goo." From the Mexican diet came "pepper-belly," "taco-choker," "frijole guzzler," "chili picker," and, for a woman, "hot tamale."²⁵

When Americans entered the Southwest as a conquering caste, they reacted to the ethnic geography much as the Spaniards had in 1598; they saw few cultural distinctions and lumped everyone into large panethnic groups. Certainly long-standing cleavages and status differentiations on the basis of race, occupation, legitimacy, property ownership, and even religion existed among the area's newly denominated *mexicanos*, who themselves had only become *mexicanos* with independence in 1821. In addition, the older, long-established Spanish residents of the area clearly deemed themselves superior and different from the Mexican immigrants who had started to cross the border into the United States in large numbers during the gold rush, and particularly after the 1880s as Mexico's modernization displaced many peasants northward, creating the conditions for Mexico's 1910 revolution. But through the eyes of Americans, the residents of the area all looked alike, dressed alike, spoke Spanish, and were fanatical Catholics. They were all Mexicans, pure and simple. The deep-seated racial prejudice among some

americanos toward blacks was easily transferred to persons of Spanish origin due to their darker skin color.²⁶

Calling someone a "Mexican" in 1850 was deeply insulting to a *mexicano* because the English word "Mexican" signified a dominated population, stigmatized by defeat and subordination. "Mexican" rapidly became the insulting expletive hurled to hurt its auditors as "mex," "meskin," "skin," and "skindiver," or modified with adjectives such as "dirty," "stinking," "greasy," "lazy," and "ugly." *Mexicano* responses to such insults came in two forms. First, they crafted distinctions in Spanish that were understood only within their linguistic community, and, second, they created larger imagined communities of belonging that were hemispheric and global in reach, far beyond the boundaries of the national geography of the United States in which they found themselves subordinated and marginalized. Although I have found no good example from 1850–1900 to illustrate the politics of language in such a colonial situation, the larger theoretical point here can be made with an example from the 1950s. Arthur L. Campa, a linguist who spent most of his career studying the nuances of Spanish use in the United States, in the 1950s asked long-time residents of New Mexico in Spanish what their ethnicity was. Most responded, "*Soy mexicano*" (I am Mexican). When he asked the same individuals what they liked to be called in English, they responded, "Spanish American." Campa then again asked in Spanish, "What do you call a person from Mexico?" The response was "*mexicano de México*" (Mexican from Mexico). One informant remarked that in English such a person was simply a Mexican because "Mexican . . . is the most used when someone is being rude. . . . Example—dirty Mexican." Another echoed this sentiment. "I'd rather not be called Mexican because of the stereotype remarks that are associated with it. Such as lazy, dirty, greaser, etc."²⁷

To understand the ethnic categories *mexicanos* chose for themselves or bore the brunt of, bear in mind that the effective sociopolitical conquest of the Southwest occurred in different temporal registers. Gold was discovered in California in 1848, six months after the Mexican War ended. It was thus here that we first find the *californios* invoking ethnic categories they would use as *mexicanos* to resist domination throughout the Southwest. As the world swept into California with the gold rush, the population quickly swelled, attracting Spaniards, Chileans, Peruvians, Panamanians, even Mexicans who had vast experience mining. In 1848 California had approximately 7,500 resident Mexicans. By 1850, the population had grown to 92,598; by 1860 it had reached 379,994.²⁸ Similar demographic transformations occurred in Texas in the 1860s and 1870s, and in New Mexico in the years preceding and following the arrival of the railroad in 1879.

The *californios* referred to prospectors of Mexican nationality as *mexicanos* when speaking among themselves in Spanish, for they were indeed Mexicans. But when speaking English, they called these same miners "Mexicans," a label the *californios* fiercely resisted when it was used to refer to them. Anglos saw no apparent physical or cultural difference between the *californios* and Mexicans; both were alike. To counter being stereotyped as a conquered population, to insist that they were unlike Mexican nationals, and to imagine

membership in larger, liberatory spaces, *californios* began insisting that they were either *latinoamericanos*, or *hispanoamericanos*. Here, then, are the first Spanish-language invocations by the former *españoles* of Mexico's far north, calling themselves in shortened form *hispanos* and *latinos*, which when translated into English circulated in print as "Latins," "Latin Americans," "Hispanics," and "Spanish Americans."²⁹

Readers with a contemporary understanding of the emergence of the word "Hispanic" as a U.S. census category in 1980, and "Latino" as an emergent panethnicity in the early 1970s, may justifiably wonder how this occurred. To understand this development, let us imagine the circumstances of the former creole elite in California, buffeted by the war and the gold rush, seeing their land fraudulently seized, their language denigrated, their schools closed, and their religion mocked. These were men and women who started patriotic societies, who were literate and who began to write, publish, and circulate their sentiments broadly, informing their communities and compatriots around the world how *la raza hispana* (the Hispanic race), how *el pueblo latinoamericano* (the Latin American people) of California were faring miserably under the rule of the United States. The capacious scope of their geographic horizons is apparent even in the names of the newspapers they published in Spanish. In San Francisco there was *La Voz de México* (The Voice of Mexico), *El Nuevo Mundo* (The New World), *La Voz de Chile y de las Repúblicas Americanas* (The Voice of Chile and of the American Republics), and *El Eco del Pacífico* (The Echo of the Pacific, which was the Spanish-language insert in the French daily *L'Echo du Pacifique*); in Los Angeles was *El Amigo del Pueblo* (The Friend of the People) and *El Clamor Público* (The Public Outcry).

Why did "Hispanic" and "Latino" emerge as words of collective self-description in the 1850s, given the many lexical alternatives that could have been used to describe the older-still resident Spanish colonial population? "Hispanic" is easier to explain simply because of the area's genealogical origins as a Spanish colony. Living by then under U.S. sovereignty, the creole elites recalled nostalgically their former mother country, claimed they spoke *castellano*, ordered books and merchandise from Spain, and even had a *Tienda Española* (Spanish store) in San Francisco, where they could indulge themselves in memories of the good old days they hoped might return.³⁰ Newspapers regularly called out their countrymen to employment opportunities and events with the headline "*Aviso a los Hispano-Americanos*" (An Announcement for Hispanic Americans). *Nativos* (natives) rallied against *extranjeros* (foreigners), referring to themselves as *la raza Hispano Americana* (the Hispanic American race), noting that a new bilingual school in Los Angeles sought students "*de raza Española*" (of the Spanish race) in 1856. Writing in English, Francisco Ramírez, the owner of the Los Angeles newspaper *El Clamor Público*, praised "the young and rising generation" as "Spanish-American."³¹ Disgruntled by the race relations they faced in California after 1848, in 1856 a group consisting of "*mexicanos, hispano-americanos y californios*" (Mexicans, Hispanic Americans, and Californians) formed a colonizing party for the purpose of emigrating from California southward to Sonora, Mexico, where they hoped they would thrive.

The word *latinoamericano* emerged in the years following the wars of independence in Spain's former colonies. Creole intellectuals from these newly independent nations turned to France for inspiration, finding in its revolutionary articulation of rights, liberty, and citizenship ways to think about their own freedom, emancipation, and autonomy. Residing in Paris and congregated around a young French intellectual named Michel Chevalier, in 1851 they discussed alternative modernities and subsequently invented "Latin America" as a way to map a new geography for the postcolonial global order. In the political ideology that birthed *latinoamerica* and *latinidad*, creole and mestizo elites imagined a hemispheric unity that would supersede and perhaps thwart the political and cultural impact of European imperialisms, and, most importantly, envisage Latin America as part of a world order. As Torres Caicedo, the Colombian intellectual who was catalytic in advancing the idea, noted, "There is Anglo-Saxon America, Danish America, Dutch America, etc.; there is also Spanish America, French America and Portuguese America; and therefore to this second group what other scientific name applies but Latin?"³² Earlier in the century, Simón Bolívar had attempted to weld northern South America into a Gran Colombia, and from that to forge a larger "Confederation of Spanish American Nations." By 1850, Bolívar had been dead for twenty years. The space he denominated "Spanish America" was forgotten, its glimmer revived as "Latin America," and at century's end, José Martí fleetingly reimagined it anew as *Nuestra América*, or "Our America."

By the late 1850s, *californios* were writing in newspapers about their membership in *América latina* (Latin America) and *latinoamerica*, calling themselves *latinos* as the shortened name for their hemispheric membership in *la raza latina* (the Latin race). Reprinting an 1858 opinion piece by a correspondent in Havana on race relations in the Americas, *El Clamor Público* of Los Angeles surmised that "two rival races are competing with each other . . . the Anglo Saxon and the Latin one [*la raza latina*]."³³

Hispano and *latino*, as abbreviated versions of *Hispano-Americano* and *latinoamericano*, flourished in California's Spanish-language discourse during the second half of the nineteenth century but had virtually disappeared by the 1920s. The explanation for this appears to be found in the increasing number of Mexican immigrants fleeing the violence and displacement of the 1910–1917 Mexican Revolution and finding employment in California. From 1911 to 1920, 219,000 Mexican immigrants formally entered the United States; from 1921 to 1930, this number more than doubled reaching 459,287. In the face of this demographic increase, "Mexican" and "Mexican American" became prominent ways of describing the numerically ascendant immigrants and *hispano*, *latino*, in all of their Spanish-language forms virtually disappeared, only to reemerge to the east fifty years later, in Chicago in the 1970s.

Tejanos, like the *californios*, called themselves *mexicanos* and *latinoamericanos* in Spanish-language discourse during the last half of the nineteenth century, but I have found no textual evidence of the use of *Hispano-Americano*. When the *tejanos* joined forces in 1836 with the Anglo settlers of Texas to form an independent republic, they decisively rejected their Mexican citizenship and membership in the Mexican nation,

only to be constantly reminded in the language of their oppressors that whatever their wealth or rank, they were still nothing but dirty, stinking Mexicans. In the 1920s, faced with the same discrimination and prejudice Mexican immigrants suffered in California, the old-time *tejanos* insisted on being called "Latin Americans" (*latinoamericanos*) in polite, English-speaking company. Indeed, this was the self-referential English word they chose in 1929 when *tejano* community leaders established the first major Mexican American civil rights organization in the United States, calling it the League of United Latin American Citizens, or LULAC for short.³⁴

The pace of demographic change was much slower in New Mexico because the monetization of land there did not reach a fevered pitch until the arrival of the railroad in 1879 and because statehood was not won until 1912. Unlike in California and Texas where Mexican immigrants quickly outnumbered the *nativos*, few Mexican peasants who had been displaced by modernization arrived in New Mexico in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, and fewer refugees of the Mexican Revolution found safety and employment there, so *nuevomexicanos* were able to hold on to their older identities as *españoles* and *hispanoamericanos* much longer. *Hispanoamericano* was often translated into English as "Spanish American." A. Gabriel Meléndez and Doris Meyer, historians of the New Mexico nineteenth-century Spanish-language print culture explain that the word *hispanoamericano* was used frequently to resist Anglo-American racism while simultaneously asserting their membership in a larger transnational, global community that existed to protect their liberty and rights. The editors of Spanish-language newspapers formed La Asociación de la Prensa Asociada Hispano-Americana in Las Vegas, New Mexico, in 1892, to serve as "the trustee and defender of the race it represents." Writing on March 31, 1892, in *El Sol de Mayo*, which was published in Las Vegas, New Mexico, Manuel C. de Baca wrote that the press association would "take up . . . its duty . . . so that *hispano-americanos* will bring to an end the repeated injuries that all too frequently are directed at them."³⁵ For as the publisher of the Taos, New Mexico, *La Revista de Taos* announced in the "Himno del Hispano" (the Hispanic's Hymn) in 1915,

We do not want racial law,
We do not want discord
We want unity and peace
With equal rights and rewards.
We want to be free men
Who enjoy freedom,
Without the shackles and chains
That come with tyranny . . .
We want the schools
Both primary and secondary
Not to be used like matches
To inflame exclusion.
We want free men, not intruders,

We were born on this land,
Not to endure abuses
That cry for almighty justice.³⁶

By the 1920s Mexican immigrants had arrived throughout the Southwest in large numbers; New Mexico was by then no exception, recruiting cheap labor for agriculture and mining. New Mexico's *nativos* reacted to these numbers by distancing and differentiating themselves as *hispanoamericanos*, or as "Spanish Americans," when speaking or writing in English, not wanting to be lumped together with Mexican nationals, whom they viewed as rough and uncouth members of the lower class. New Mexico had long been historically marginal to New Spain, to central Mexico, even to the Republic of Mexico once it gained independence. This fact prompted one man to state, "My identity has always been closer to Spanish as an ethnic group and for that reason I consider myself Spanish. . . . Being from northern New Mexico the only connection I have with anything Mexican is as a tourist and not as my national origin."³⁷ Novelist Erna Fergusson proposed that the ethnic category "Spanish American" came into popular use in New Mexico after World War I to counter the Anglo-American perception that soldiers who called themselves *mexicanos* when speaking in Spanish were aliens from another country. Anthropologist Nancie González largely concurred. The term "Spanish American" emerged in response to an upsurge of prejudice and discrimination against Spanish speakers in New Mexico during the 1920s.³⁸

Arizona too had a core of original settler *españoles* who had been residing there since the 1690s. On January 14, 1894, Carlos Velasco, Pedro Pellón, Mariano Samaniego, and some forty-six other men gathered in Tucson to establish the Alianza Hispano-Americana, which announced as its motto "*Protección, Moralidad, e Instrucción*," or "the protection of *Hispano-Americanos* (Hispanic Americans)" through mutual aid and fraternalism, through a morality that focused on the common good, and through the acquisition of knowledge that would lead to self-improvement and communal advance.³⁹ By 1930 the Alianza Hispano-Americana had become the largest ethnic Mexican fraternal organization in the United States, with more than 17,000 members scattered throughout the Southwest. It did this by rallying *españoles* and *mexicanos* in Arizona, and then in New Mexico and California, to the effects of Anglo-American racism on their daily lives, the need for the development of a group consciousness to resist and thwart it, and a cultural solidarity across the class divide that then existed among *Mexicanos*. But the massive levels of Mexican immigration into Arizona that started during the 1910 revolution and accelerated in the 1920s produced similar tensions between Spanish and Mexican group membership. Whereas in New Mexico the local *españoles* differentiated themselves from the immigrants at that moment by calling themselves "Spanish Americans," and in Spanish *hispanos*, in Arizona *hispano-americano* disappeared from print, along with the Spanish-language newspapers that had kept it alive, and one can only speculate that it also eventually fell out of use in conversation.⁴⁰

As should be obvious from these examples of ethnic categories fashioned in the American Southwest, first in response to Anglo-American conquest and then to massive levels of Mexican immigration, the longtime local populations called themselves *hispanos* and *hispano-americanos* to assert their racial whiteness. They claimed European origins as Spaniards, and by so doing, doggedly resisted being labeled "nonwhite" and thus presumed to be of the same lowly status as blacks. Whenever Anglo-Americans have wanted to depict the Spanish origins of the ethnic Mexicans in the United States positively and affirmatively, they have referred to them as "Spanish," "Spanish Americans," "Spanish speakers," and "individuals of Spanish surname," thereby declaring them ancestrally tied to European civilization and racial whiteness. Identifying someone as Spanish immediately signaled membership in a set of overlapping groups—religious, linguistic, legal, and cultural—that through Spain could be tied back to Rome. In *Racial Faultlines: The Historical Origins of White Supremacy in California*, sociologist Tomás Almaguer argues that in the racial order in which *californios* found themselves after 1848, they invoked Spanish and Hispanic origins to establish the de jure whiteness they had been accorded by the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo but that rarely materialized de facto. In the racial hierarchy Anglo-Americans imposed throughout the Southwest, the cultural connection to European and Roman origins, as remote as it might be, was what made the *californios* superior to Indians, Asians, and African Americans, who had no comparable claims to whiteness.⁴¹

Thus far we have discussed two instances of military conquest—the Spanish colonization of the indigenous peoples who resided in Mexico's far north that began in 1598, and the annexation of this same territory by the United States in 1848 at the end of the Mexican War—to illustrate how ethnic labels and emergent nationalisms were named and imposed from above, but equally resisted from below, employing code switching into a different language to demarcate "us" and "them." We turn now to a third example of the conjuring of national aspirations and their ideal ordering through the process of naming. Above, we discussed the mid-nineteenth century origins of the word "Latino" as an English-language panethnicity that brings together, from below, Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, and a range of Latin American—origin immigrants in the United States. In this section we will also turn to the word "Hispanic," which likewise entered our vocabulary as an English-language word imposed from above, by the U.S. Census Bureau in 1980, to aggregate Latin American—origin peoples as a panethnic group.

The *Oxford English Dictionary* (OED) defines a "Latino" (note that it is now an English word found in most American English dictionaries) as "A Latin-American inhabitant of the United States." According to the OED, the word's etymology is *latinoamericano*, which in Spanish means "Latin American." The OED offers several historical uses of the word, starting in 1945 and running to 1974, when "Latino" entered popular parlance among English speakers. The first recorded use of the word "Latino" in print appeared

in 1946, in a book entitled *San Antonio*, which describes a musical performance by a group of Latin American exchange students that took place at the University of Texas. G. Peyton, the book's author, snidely remarks, "That in itself would be a fresh intellectual experience for Texas, where Latinos are usually looked on as sinister specimens of an inferior race." Next came Lady Bird Johnson's *White House Diary*, which contained an entry for April 2, 1970, noting that "Six young girls, all Latinos, had encased themselves in cardboard boxes" during a White House lawn party for the Latin American diplomatic corps. Finally, *The Black Panther*, the Black Panther Party's newspaper, reported on March 17, 1973: "A program was drawn up . . . by an . . . action group composed of Blacks, Latinos, and Whites."⁴²

The first two recorded references to "Latinos" in English were tied geographically to ethnic understandings of group membership and belonging in Texas, where calling someone a "Mexican" in the 1940s was extremely insulting. In polite English-speaking company, if the intention was to praise or honor ethnic Mexicans, they were called "Latin Americans." If the intent was to ostracize and humiliate, they were simply "Mexicans." As we have seen, the first Mexican American civil rights organization in the country was named the League of United Latin American Citizens by its Texas founders.⁴³ What should also be highlighted in the above-cited OED passages from G. Peyton's book and *The Black Panther* newspaper is that "Latino" referred to an "inferior race." In the late 1960s members of minority communities began recognizing three distinct races—black, white, and Latino—to signal that American society had moved beyond its simple black/white racial dichotomy, which no longer adequately described the racism persons of Latin American origin experienced in the United States.

Sociologists Alejandro Portes and Rubén G. Rumbaut tell us that when immigrants and their progeny enter American society and are largely greeted with hostility, segregation, and overtly racist acts, they react negatively, often gathering defensively and collectively to assert their own dignity and self-worth. *Latinidad*, that communal sense of membership in a group tied to Latin America through ancestry, language, culture, and history, emerged from below precisely out of such nationalist sentiments. Individuals first started calling themselves "Latinos" in cities like Chicago and New York, largely to advance political agendas not easily achievable by small, isolated, and distinct national-origin groups. By coming together as Latinos, they swelled their numbers, and expanded their political clout as they demanded inclusion in the polity through affirmative action, fair housing, voting rights, and bilingual education. In time *Latinidad* was also championed from above by ethnic specific civil rights organizations seeking grander nationwide influence and larger membership rolls. Eventually, government bureaucrats, foundations, and corporate marketers recognized the utility of *Latinidad*. Its broadest diffusion has been at the hands of media conglomerates and advertising companies.⁴⁴

Ethnic Mexicans are the largest, best documented, and most regionally dispersed of the immigrant groups that hail from Latin America whose members often call them-

selves "Latinos." They are now the largest ethnic group in the United States, having surpassed African Americans in numbers and proportion of the country's total population. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, as of July 1, 2013, the country had a Latino population of 54 million, representing approximately 17 percent of the country's total. Of these 54 million, 34.6 million are of Mexican ancestry. Their sustained presence in areas that eventually were incorporated into the United States dates back to the 1598 establishment of a Spanish colony in New Mexico. Their numbers were increased by the annexation of the Republic of Texas (1845) and the acquisition of northern Mexico's provinces (1848), and grew exponentially with the flight northward of refugees during the Mexican Revolution (1910–1917) and the development of agricultural production in the Southwest that relied on a guest worker program (the Bracero Program) between 1942 and 1964, which recruited millions of workers both legally and illegally.

Today, the majority of Mexican Americans are relegated to the lowest rungs of the economy, working as unskilled laborers in service industries, agriculture, and construction. The history of discrimination against them is well known and extensively chronicled. Their work has been valued differentially at lower rates and afforded few legal protections, and, in cases of superexploitation, they have been left with few remedies, even through recourse to courts of law. Their segregation in barrios, or ghettos, has been marked by substandard housing with little access to public transportation and commerce, and even fewer bridging ties to earning and learning opportunities. Their children historically have been systematically denied quality education by restricting their access to schools reserved for whites, by refusing to employ bilingual and bicultural instructors to facilitate the transition to English-language mastery, by tracking them into lower-paid trades rather than college preparatory courses, and by assigning underprepared and derelict teachers to their dilapidated, underfunded schools. Despite the fact that the majority of ethnic Mexicans were born in the United States, are naturalized citizens, or are here legally on work visas, their phenotype is equated with the stigma of "illegality," which frequently results in racial profiling and harassment by the police, thus robbing them of the equal protection the law guarantees. When accused of crimes in past times, they were rarely judged by their peers, were handed stiffer sentences than whites, and were constantly surveilled, trends that have continued to the present.⁴⁵

A similar history of discrimination and marginalization can be recited concerning the 5 million Puerto Ricans who currently live on the U.S. mainland. They are the second-largest Latino group, and together with Mexican Americans account for 73 percent of all Latinos. Puerto Rico was originally explored by Christopher Columbus on his second voyage to the Americas in 1493 and was settled by Spanish colonists soon after. For most of its Spanish colonial history, Puerto Rico was largely a military fort and entrepôt for commerce between Mexico and Spain. In the early part of the nineteenth century, as Spanish America's various regions won their independence, only Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines failed to break Spain's colonial grip. Though there has been plenty

of sentiment and activity for the proclamation of Puerto Rican independence since 1810, it has been repeatedly thwarted by Spain, and then by the United States. The latter had long coveted the island as a way of achieving its own larger geopolitical visions of hemispheric empire and repeatedly asserted such claim, at various times offering to buy the island from Spain. In 1898 the United States provoked war with Spain over the Philippines, which quickly spread to the Caribbean as well. When the Spanish-American War ended with the Treaty of Paris in 1898, the United States emerged as the victor and took possession of Cuba and Puerto Rico, quickly smashing Puerto Rico's independence movement, establishing its sovereignty over the island with the 1900 Foraker Act, and declaring Puerto Ricans citizens of the United States through the Jones Act of 1917.

Puerto Rico's population remained largely confined to the island between 1900 and 1930, with approximately 1,800 individuals migrating to the mainland yearly during this period. This trend accelerated in the years before World War II, when increasing numbers migrated to New York City to take its unskilled jobs and to enter military rolls. In 1940 there were 69,967 Puerto Ricans living on the mainland, the vast majority in New York City. By 1950 that number had increased to 226,110, by 1970 to 1,391,464, by 2000 to 3.4 million, and by 2013 to 5 million. While in 1940, 88 percent of all Puerto Ricans on the mainland lived in New York state, by 1980 they were much more dispersed, with only 49 percent in New York, 12 percent in New Jersey, 6.4 percent in Illinois, and approximately 4.5 percent in California, Florida, Pennsylvania, and Connecticut. By 2010, only about 20 percent of mainland Puerto Ricans resided in New York City.⁴⁶

The problems Puerto Ricans faced in the United States were not unlike those of Mexican Americans. While the presence of Mexicans in the United States had long been suspect and equated with illegality, Puerto Ricans have been de jure citizens since 1917, but rarely treated so de facto. Their life chances on the mainland have been limited, despite repeated scholarly studies proclaiming that they too eventually would be integrated into the American body politic as other immigrant groups had. If they learned English, took American brides, accepted the Protestant work ethic, and persevered in school, they too would move out of their ghettos and gain political representation and upward mobility. In 1976 the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights issued a report entitled *Puerto Ricans in the Continental United States: An Uncertain Future* that concluded that the majority of Puerto Ricans were living in substandard housing, were unemployed and living in poverty, had poor access to education and health care, and inordinately suffered from racial discrimination. Ten years after the United States declared a "War on Poverty," Puerto Ricans remained in the ranks of the war-scarred poor.⁴⁷

I recite this history of inequities Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans have experienced to help explain what led them to abandon older forms of political activism rooted in self-help associations, in mutual aid societies, in labor unions, and in ethnic churches, for the militant, reactive nationalism they forged in the late 1960s. Mexican Americans then announced themselves "Chicanos" as a colonized nationality demand-

ing self-determination and national autonomy, much as Puerto Ricans started to call themselves "Boricuas" and advocated similar forms of nationhood. Both eschewed any association with racial whiteness, something civil rights organizations had invoked since the 1920s to distance themselves from the stigma of blackness. Both Chicanos and Boricuas found inspiration in the aspirations and organizational structures of the Black Panther Party. Chicanos accordingly founded the Brown Berets and Boricuas, the Young Lords, heralding racialized brown and black pride. Whereas their parents and grandparents had eschewed the color categories of their oppressors, now the young embraced them with gusto as oppositional badges of authenticity.

Those who identified as Chicanos and Boricuas gave territorial dimensions to their nationalist sentiments, seeking succession and national sovereignty as the antidote to their histories of segregation and marginalization in the United States. Chicanos proclaimed that they would unite, as the nation of Aztlán, the states of California, Arizona, Texas, New Mexico, Colorado, and Nevada, returning to Mexican control these territories lost in 1845 and 1848.⁴⁸ Boricuas deemed Puerto Ricans living on the island and mainland a "divided nation." If liberation was to occur for mainland Puerto Ricans, they had to bring national liberation to the island first. In early 1971 the Young Lords began their "Ofensiva Rompecadenas" (Break-the-Chains Offensive), asking for unity in their attempt to gain Puerto Rican independence. Though such a territorial ambition had been pursued militantly since the 1950s, its embrace by the Young Lords ultimately weakened their organization, spread its resources thin, and caused considerable factionalism between themselves and the island's political groups. By late 1972 the Young Lords repudiated this strategy, arguing instead that Puerto Ricans were an "oppressed national minority" in the United States, that Puerto Rico was a nation, and that mainland Puerto Ricans had to focus their energies on their compatriots in the United States.⁴⁹

Besides such dreams of national autonomy and self-determination, Chicanos and Boricuas both espoused an ideology of self-help, seeking the improvement of their co-ethnics. Inspired by César Chávez, they supported his unionization campaign for better wages and working conditions for farm workers of every nationality. Reies López Tijerina's movement to regain lands fraudulently stolen from *mexicanos* in New Mexico, Colorado, and Texas similarly heightened their understanding of the importance of land ownership to economic well-being. In places like New York City, Denver, Albuquerque, and Los Angeles, they protested police brutality. In New York, Texas, New Mexico, and California, the states with the densest Mexican American and Puerto Rican populations, they launched legal challenges against discriminatory schooling, housing, employment practices, policing, and the exercise of justice by the courts.

Equally important to both Chicanos and Boricuas was their assault on racism in its material, psychic, and institutionalized forms. Heralding their personal beauty and pride both movements affirmed the beauty of their art, language, culture, and skin color as a way to corrode the toxicity of racism. Pedro Pietri captured this sense of pride in his now famous book of poems, *Puerto Rican Obituary*.

Here lies Juan
 Here lies Miguel
 Here lies Olga
 Here lies Manuel
 Who died yesterday today
 And will die again tomorrow
 Always broke
 Always owing
 Never knowing
 That they are beautiful people
 Never knowing
 The geography of their complexion
 PUERTO RICO IS A BEAUTIFUL PLACE
 PUERTORIQUEÑOS ARE A BEAUTIFUL RACE⁵⁰

Rodolfo "Corky" Gonzales's poem "I Am Joaquín," similarly was meant to incite Chicano rebellion and cultural pride. The poem, excerpted here, begins and ends as follows:

Yo soy Joaquín,
 perdido en un mundo de confusión:
 I am Joaquín,
 lost in a world of confusion,
 caught up in the whirl of a gringo society,
 confused by the rules, scorned by attitudes,
 suppressed by manipulation, and destroyed by modern society . . .
 in all the fertile farmlands,
 the barren plains,
 the mountain villages,
 smoke-smeared cities,
 we start to MOVE.
 La raza!
 Méjicano!
 Español!
 Latino!
 Chicano!
 Or whatever I call myself,
 I look the same
 I feel the same
 I cry
 And
 Sing the same.
 I am the masses of my people and
 I refuse to be absorbed.
 I am Joaquín.

The odds are great
 But my spirit is strong,
 My faith unbreakable,
 My blood is pure.
 I am Aztec prince and Christian Christ.
 I SHALL ENDURE!
 I WILL ENDURE!⁵¹

The "Plan Espiritual de Aztlán," the 1969 document that birthed the Chicano student movement, offered a capacious blueprint for how national unity and political empowerment would be achieved. It called for unity among all racially oppressed groups, for community control over local institutions and the communitarian management of its resources through responsible capitalism, for culturally relevant educational curricula with community control of schools, for the development of institutions that would protect Chicano civil and human rights and guarantee fair wages, for community self-defense through humanitarianism, for a contestational cultural politics "to defeat the gringo dollar value system," and for the rejection of the two-party system for a more equitable pluralist politics.⁵²

In the forty-seven years since the plan was issued, many have questioned the nationalism it spawned as crude because it fractured the liberal civil rights coalition that was being forged, and because it celebrated a culture of violence, hypermasculinity, sexism, and homophobia that was on display not only in boardrooms but in bedrooms too. The plan nevertheless created an alternative vision of cultural incorporation and membership in a body politic, challenged unbridled capitalism, and framed the local in relationship to the global, simultaneously linking local struggles for self-determination with global anti-imperialist ones. It created organizations for community policing, food cooperatives, and educational campaigns for safer food, healthier bodies, and sharper minds.

The thirteen-point platform of the Puerto Rican Young Lords made almost identical demands:

We want community control of our institutions and land. We want control of our communities by our people and programs to guarantee that all institutions serve the needs of our people. People's control of police, health services, churches, schools, housing, transportation, and welfare are needed. We want an end to attacks on our land by urban renewal, highway destruction, and university corporations. LAND BELONGS TO ALL THE PEOPLE!⁵³

The oppositional consciousness and militant nationalism Chicanos and Boricuas articulated established the groundwork for the emergence of *Latinidad*. As far as I have been able to ascertain, Chicago was the place an explicit sense of group membership as Latinos emerged into public visibility, precisely out of older coalitional politics. Mexi-

can Americans and Puerto Ricans there understood that if they were to enhance their material lives, they had to come together to advance collective goals. In the early 1970s, this took the form of the La Coalición Latinoamericana de Empleos. Instead of translating the group's name literally as "The Latin American Jobs Coalition," they chose "The Spanish Coalition for Jobs." Composed of twenty-three Puerto Rican and Mexican American community organizations, the coalition explicitly militated for the improvement of "Latinos'" lives through work, demanding first that Illinois Bell Telephone and Jewel Tea Company honor federal affirmative action policies. As the coalition's foundational document explained, they had united because "the racist attitude of employers triggered us into utilizing our consumer power as a tool or bargaining device . . . to compete in the job market."⁵⁴

Illinois Bell was their first target. In 1971 coalition representatives repeatedly met with the company's management to question why its workforce of 44,000 included only 300 Latinos, demanding that 3,000 new Latino workers be hired. Illinois Bell's retort was an offer of 115 jobs. What followed was the first mass action organized in the name of Latinos, and the group picketed the company's headquarters in Chicago starting in mid-September 1971. On June 14, 1972, a settlement was reached. Illinois Bell agreed to hire 1,323 Latinos and two top-level executives by the end of 1976, and would form a community review committee to chart the company's progress toward these goals.⁵⁵

The coalition next targeted Chicago's Jewel Tea Company, presenting it with similar demands in March 1972. The company had received more than \$250,000 from the federal government to train minority workers for work in their stores, yet only 140 Latinos had been hired. The coalition cited statistics about Jewel's workforce and the underrepresentation of Latinos. After almost a year of picketing, in the summer of 1973, Jewel agreed to hire more Latinos through an independent job placement agency.⁵⁶

These initial successes intensified the coalition's sense of unity, and on March 16, 1973, it convened a "Latino Strategies for the 70s" conference. The press release for the event announced: "The brown skin Latino has awakened and he will never be the same again . . . because he knows that to live is to enjoy freedom. He has learned that to be a Latino is good."⁵⁷ Among the many conference outcomes was the formation of the "Latino Institute" to bring into constant contact the coalition's initial constituent groups. The Latino Institute took as its first major goal the education of Latino parents about bilingual education, teaching parents how to advocate for it, how to choose from the range of bilingual education models, and how to evaluate a school's progress in educating their children in their native Spanish language.

Since the emergence of *Latinidad* as a panethnic form of consciousness that emphasized an antiracist coalitional politics among Chicago's Latinos in the early 1970s, a number of studies have appeared chronicling different aspects of it in other American cities. What makes it difficult to compare these works is that when they articulate the contours of *Latinidad*, they have very different notions of its embodiment and deployment in mind. Two well-regarded studies of *Latinidad* take a bottom-up perspective

for the emergence of panethnicity, arguing that the daily experiences of social interaction on neighborhood streets, in residences, in markets, in houses of worship, and in workplaces foster a sense of commonality among immigrants from many Latin American countries. Two books maintain that women are the active agents who diffuse and cement *Latinidad* as lived experience: Carol Hardy-Fanta's *Latina Politics, Latino Politics: Gender, Culture, and Political Participation in Boston*, which focuses on language politics surrounding bilingual education and campaigns to elect Latino candidates to political posts, and Milagros Ricourt and Ruby Danta's *Hispanas de Queens: Latino Panethnicity in a New York City Neighborhood*, which studies how women in Corona and Queens interact.⁵⁸ When women gather in the stairwells of their apartment buildings to gossip about local affairs, when women commiserate about the poor education their children receive, when they gather at the local laundromat, when they wrangle over the price of tomatoes and potatoes with a local vender, and when they chat about their personal worlds and commiserate over their life challenges, they interact in the Spanish language, connect with Latin Americans from different places, and by doing so give *Latinidad* tangible meanings. Of course, immigrants from Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, and Guatemala do not quickly or easily lose their natal nationalities, but by constantly interacting, or so these female authors contend, women are creating the behavioral, interactional foundation for *Latinidad*.⁵⁹

Open up any newspaper, listen to any talk radio show, or watch the television pundits, and what they repeatedly announce is that Latinos are an emerging majority that every day is becoming more potent in politics, commerce, and the very racial makeup of the United States. How much unity exists among Latinos? How operative and decisive is *Latinidad* in the lives of people who claim it or among the individuals who are lumped into this imagined community? The simple demographic fact is that the Latino population of the United States is large and diverse, encompassing more than twenty nationalities, and numerous languages that include a complex tapestry of indigenous ones. Latinos occupy various class locations and span the entire spectrum of race and color. Nothing specifically unites Latinos. In the past Roman Catholicism was such a glue for many, but even here Protestant evangelical churches and indigenous religions factionalize that unity, if indeed it ever existed. In places where the two largest Latino groups—Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans—have been in close contact for long periods, relationships of affiliation and trust exist, as well as relationships of chauvinism and suspicion. As Nicholas de Genova and Ana Y. Ramos-Zayas make clear in their study of relations between Mexicans and Puerto Ricans in Chicago during the late 1990s, a period only twenty years after the exuberance of Latino unity in the 1970s chronicled above, relations between the two groups were tense and were often marked by antagonism. Mexicans resented Puerto Ricans because of their citizenship status, which entitled them to welfare and government assistance, and thus constantly demonized them as lazy, welfare dependent, and abusers of state benefits for the poor. Mexicans suffered the stigma of illegality, of being unauthorized immigrants in the

United States, and thus were seen by Puerto Ricans as persons who allowed themselves to be exploited easily, accepting minimal wages and operating in an underworld of illicit drugs, prostitution, and gangs to make their way in the United States.⁶⁰ Thus, whatever unity and political cohesion *Latinidad* provided these two groups in Chicago in the 1970s, by 2000 that sentiment had evaporated into fractious relations, largely because of the growth of the unauthorized Mexican immigrant population that began competing with Puerto Ricans for low-paying jobs.

By now, attentive readers may be wondering about the place of Cuban Americans in this history of the radicalization of Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans in the United States. The Cuban Revolution occurred in 1959, but it was not until the early 1960s that significant numbers of Cubans fled the island for residence ninety miles away, concentrating mostly in Miami and more generally in Florida. The Cubans who arrived in the United States as political refugees fleeing Communism were of a much higher class (mostly elites and middle-class professionals), carried immensely more money and cultural capital with them, often already had homes and businesses in the United States, and quickly became beneficiaries of affirmative action programs meant for persons who had had fewer privileges and opportunities in American life. What radicalism Cuban refugees did express was focused on the regime of Fidel Castro, on their return to Cuba to overthrow the Cuban Revolution, and was entirely anti-Communist in nature.

Cuban Americans did not actively participate in claiming or shaping *Latinidad* because of their class positions and their laser-like focus on the overthrow of Castro's regime. They were nevertheless instrumental in domesticating and naturalizing *Latinidad*, transforming it from an oppositional and reactive sentiment to a media and marketing one primarily focused on the consumption of Latin American panethnic services and goods. In the 1950s much of the advertising by American firms that took place in Latin America was designed and purchased in Havana, Miami, and New York. After the Cuban Revolution, many of the Cuban advertising executives immigrated to New York and Miami, whence they resumed their activities. In the 1970s and 1980s, these mostly Cuban Americans started a process of combining Latin American national groups into a larger marketing sector, which they also called "Latino." If they could create a clearly larger Latino market than was represented by individual national groups, and identify its needs and desires, they stood to profit enormously as individuals and as the advertising firms that knew precisely how to pitch products to this group. With that expertise they stood ready to persuade the large corporations producing food, beverages, and a host of domestic goods that Latinos constituted a significant mass market that needed special ad campaigns that only their advertising agencies were expertly prepared to create. This is exactly what happened, argues Arlene Dávila in *Latinos Inc.: The Marketing and Making of a People*. These advertising people began educating the manufacturers of products about what the Latino market wanted and would consume. The producers then purchased advertising campaigns targeted to the Latino market the ad agencies

had invented. Quickly, then, beer, soda pop, cooking oil, even bleach came to embody *lo latino*, that unique Latino essence that only the Coors Brewing Company, PepsiCo, General Foods, and Clorox could deliver.⁶¹

The power of the advertising dollar and the reach of global media were also, in part, responsible for the popularization of the fiction that another word, "Hispanic," best described the putative sense of unity that existed among immigrants from Latin America residing in the United States. The U.S. Census Bureau introduced "Spanish/Hispanic origin" as a panethnic category for purposes of official data gathering and analysis in 1980. But the movement toward its codification and use was complicated, the product of negotiations with community representatives, elected officials, and state functionaries. The mobilization of ethnic communities for civil rights in the 1960s, the emergence of massive social unrest in cities across the country, and the radical nationalism young men and women began to expound as Chicanos and Boricuas all gained the attention of the Congress and of the administrations of Presidents Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard Nixon. Seeking to defuse and moderate the increasingly radical segments of these groups, in 1967, through executive order, Johnson established the Inter-Agency Committee on Mexican American Affairs (IMAA). The committee held hearings and funneled federal resources to potentially incendiary spots, increasing employment and manpower training and making the government aware of the militancy percolating in the streets. When Nixon entered the White House, he equivocated on what to do with the committee, and left it to the Congress to extend its life. It did. On December 31, 1969, President Nixon signed the bill creating the Cabinet Committee on Opportunities for Spanish Speaking People (CCOSSP). The morphing of the IMAA into a vastly expanded CCOSSP had been the result of congressional and representative politics. Among the complainants were Puerto Ricans and Cubans who felt that their grievances had been ignored by the government's almost exclusive focus on African Americans and Mexican Americans. By expanding the purview of CCOSSP to the three ethnic groups, then calling this aggregation "Spanish speakers," the Congress and the Nixon administration were simultaneously lancing a number of boils. Congressman Edward Roybal (D-CA), explained the reasons for his authorship of the bill creating CCOSSP:

The militants in our community are on our backs almost every moment of the day. And the question that is being asked of me, members of Congress, and other elected officials is, "Is it necessary for us to riot? Is it necessary for us to burn down a town before the government looks at our problems objectively? What are we to do if our community is not recognized?" Those of us who represent the Spanish-speaking communities have quite a problem on our hands. We do not want to see the violence of Watts erupt in East Los Angeles or anyplace else, and I hope that this will never come about. But the answers must be found, and I believe that one of the answers is the establishment of the [CCOSSP].⁶²

Senator Joseph M. Montoya (D-NM), the co-author of the legislation creating CCOSSP, wanted the panethnic aggregation of Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans to be called "Hispanic," and by 1980 it was.

The same activists who had lobbied Congress and gotten the federal government to create CCOSSP realized that if Mexican American issues were to receive the same level of national attention African American issues got, they needed a nationwide organization to advance their cause. In *Making Hispanics: How Activists, Bureaucrats, and Media Constructed a New American*, G. Cristina Mora studies such a transformation for the Southwest Council of La Raza. Founded in 1968 as a local, grassroots organization to fight poverty and discrimination with a regional focus primarily in Texas and California, by 1972 the Southwest Council of La Raza had become the National Council of La Raza, modeled after the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). Hoping to serve as the interlocutor for the entire Hispanic population of the United States, it opened a headquarters office in Washington, DC, and began to advocate not only for Mexican Americans, but on behalf of the social, political, and economic concerns of all Hispanics. As Mora argues, the organization's transformation occurred by first recognizing and harnessing popular identification with Hispanics, then developing a national vision and mission that included the issues of all persons of Latin American origin in the United States. With an organization, a national office, and an emergent political identity, the National Council of La Raza created the infrastructure and authority to get philanthropic groups to recognize it as the interlocutor for all Hispanics, and accordingly generously fund its work, as indeed the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations did. Finally, it gained such national visibility and economic support that the federal government sought its advice as well, calling on it to help the U.S. Census Bureau craft the ethnic categories that would be used in subsequent decennial counts. While in 1980 the U.S. household census had first asked "Is this person of Spanish/Hispanic origin or descent?" by the 2000 count "Latino" was used as equal to "Spanish/Hispanic origin." Mora argues that for "Latino" to emerge as a panethnicity, it needed not only ideological and institutional foundations, which were quickly harnessed, but it also needed a source of diffusion, which it got from Univision, the Spanish-language television network in the United States that generated its own programming aimed to appeal to American Hispanics, supplemented by programming the network purchased from other countries in the Hispanophone world.⁶³

The scholarly literature suggests that for panethnicity to emerge, one first needs a population that is significantly marginalized and exploited, and one that comes to see itself as such, in opposition to the group it deems the dominant, oppressive one. Once such a reactive ethnicity is in place, demography and geographic isolation through segregation has brought together ethnic groups that previously had no common history or mutual interests. Much of the world's ethnic politics are language politics; that

Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans, or for that matter any other combinations of Latin American national groups, shared a common language and sometimes also a common religious culture, made it easier for panethnicity to emerge, get propagated, and get institutionalized from above through such things as the boundary-making national census, or from below through interactions, commiseration, and mobilization. Evidence from Chicago over a period of forty years also shows that state action, a changing demographic balance between immigrants and the native born, between citizens and noncitizens, and more intense competition between national/ethnic groups over local resources can just as easily breed antagonisms and hatreds where once mutuality and common understanding were deemed necessary for sociality and communal advancement. Reflecting on why the 1960 count had not included a panethnic category that encompassed Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans, and Cuban Americans, one census official stated that back then they "didn't really identify [with one another, and] didn't really know what Hispanic meant." This essay has tried to show how group relations evolve over time, how state and institutional actors, journalists and media executives, as well as community organizations, all have played a role in how categories of belonging and group consciousness emerge, are sustained, and, just as often, disappear to be replaced by others.

NOTES

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23; N. Ross Crumrine, *The Mayo Indians of Sonora: A People Who Refuse to Die* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1977), p. 69.

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